Regulatory Framework for Opening, Operating and Closing a Business

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Market Competition – Competition Law

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	(
State	Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Exclusions from the Application of Comp	petition Law		
1.	No legal monopolies or SOEs excluded from application of competition law	>	Section 3, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>	
2.	Providing for a procedure to exclude a particular firm or sector from the application of antitrust and/or merger control regulations while conducting commercial activities	>	Section 5, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>	
3.	Allowing firms to seek exemptions from antitrust or merger control regulations under specified conditions for individual agreements	>	Sections 31 and 32, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>	
4.	Providing procedures to exempt category of agreements	>	Sections 9 and 15, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>	
5.	Exemption regime requiring a decision be justified on economic, social or sustainability grounds for individual agreement and categories	A	Sections 1-3 of Schedule 1 and Section 15(5), <u>Cap. 619</u> <u>Competition Ordinance</u>	
6.	Exemptions from the competition regulatory framework granted for a specific time period	A	Section 15(4), <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>	

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	4
7.	Renewal of an exemption at the end of its term contingent upon a review of the reasons for which the exemption was granted by the Competition Authority	A A	Section 19, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u> Sections IV and V, <u>Decision to Vary (Renew) the Competition</u> (<u>Block Exemption for Vessel Sharing Agreements</u>) <u>Order 2017</u>
Antit	trust and Enforcement of Competition Regulations	•	
8.	Forbidding anticompetitive agreements between firms	>	Section 6, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
9.	 Providing exemptions for the following anticompetitive agreements: Advancing certain public interests Promoting efficiency or technical and economic progress 	A	Sections 1 and 3 of Schedule 1 and Section 31, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
10.	Exemptions for anticompetitive agreements granted contingent upon the following conditions of the agreement: Being efficiency enhancing Not eliminating competition Allowing a fair share for consumers	<i>A</i>	Sections 1(a), 1(b), 1(c) and 2 of Schedule 1, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
11.	Specifying which agreements (between competitors) are forbidden in and of themselves, without the necessity to prove actual harm to either competition or consumers	>	Sections 6 and 7, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
12.	Cartels, including agreements that directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices, forbidden in and of themselves	>	Sections 6 and 7, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	C
13.	Prohibiting firms from abusing dominant positions	>	Section 21, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
14.	 Defining the following: Market dominance when firms have substantial degree of power in a market When firms are abusing their market dominance 	A	Sections 2-4, <u>Guideline on the Second Conduct Rule</u> as authorised under Section 35, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
15.	Providing a leniency program and the leniency program providing full immunity to the first firm that self-reports it involvement in anticompetitive behavior	A	Section 80, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u> <u>Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct</u> and <u>Leniency Policy for Individuals Involved in Cartel Conduct</u> as authorised under Section 35, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
16.	Subsequent firms that self-report involvement in anticompetitive behaviour receiving reductions or exemptions from financial sanctions	>	Cooperation and Settlement Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct
17.	The leniency program including a defined process with procedural guarantees for evaluating an organization's cooperation and determining the benefits they will receive	>	Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct and Leniency Policy for Individuals Involved in Cartel Conduct under Section 80, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
18.	Protecting the confidentiality of organizations that cooperate with the Competition Authority during an investigation	A	Section 4, <u>Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel</u> <u>Conduct</u> Section 4, <u>Leniency Policy for Individuals Involved in Cartel</u> <u>Conduct</u>

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	(
19.	Allowing the Competition Authority to disclose the identity of a leniency applicant when there is a legal obligation to do so as part of judicial proceedings	>	Paragraph 4.4, <u>Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel</u> <u>Conduct</u>
20.	Explicitly protecting the anonymity of organizations that cooperate with the Competition Authority during an investigation	\	Section 6, Cooperation and Settlement Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct
21.	Individual employees that report to the Competition Authority antitrust violations within their own companies given whistleblower protection	A	Section 173, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
22.	Offering incentives for firms in cases of voluntary compliance within the context of an open antitrust investigation	A	Cooperation and Settlement Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct Rule 39, Cap. 619D Competition Tribunal Rules
23.	Requiring the investigation procedures of the Competition Authority to be documented in writing	>	Sections 11, 14, 26, 29, 41, 42, 47, 60, 61, 73, 74, 81, 82, 121 and 123, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
24.	Requiring the investigation phase of the Competition Authority to be completed within a set amount of time	>	Section 92(2)(b), Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
25.	Providing parties a reasonable opportunity of the following during the investigation:	>	Sections 41, 43, 44, 45 and 50, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
	Consulting with the Competition Authority		
	Being heard and providing evidence or testimony in their defense		
	(this includes testimony of experts, cross-examination of testifying		

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	
	witnesses, and the opportunity to review or rebut any evidence brought forward)		
26.	Providing parties with an opportunity to settle or to reach a consent agreement with the Competition Authority	>	Guideline on Investigations as authorised under Section 40, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
27.	Granting the Competition Authority the power to conduct unsolicited inspections of firms' premises (such as dawn raids) to investigate illegal anticompetitive practices with a court order or warrant	>	Division 3 of Part 3, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
28.	Specifying penalties for firms that fail to comply with information requests from the Competition Authority only if the company supplies incorrect or misleading information	A	Section 55, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
29.	Establishing an overall cap on fines that can be imposed on a firm	>	Section 93, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
30.	The following criteria used to determine the fine ceiling:	>	Section 93, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
	As a percentage of the firm's global turnover		
	Based on the firm's gain from the anticompetitive practice		
	Fixed amount		
31.	Designated independent body before which firms can challenge the decisions of the Competition Authority	A	Part 5, Section 83, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u> (Competition Tribunal, Court of Appeal, Judicial review)

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	
32.	Defining procedures, requirements and standards to enable firms or individuals to pursue damages resulting from infringement of the Competition Law	>	Part 7, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
Merg	ger Control Regulations		
33.	Providing both quantitative and qualitative economic criteria specifically designed to identify transactions that fall under merger control regulations	A A	Section 3 of Schedule 7, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u> Paragraphs 3.13-3.19, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
34.	Establishing thresholds for merger notifications	A A	Schedule 4, Section 7(1) of Schedule 7, Sections 97, 99 and 100, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u> Paragraphs 3.13-3.20, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
35.	Specifying a threshold for merger notifications based on both individual turnover (concerning the turnover of the target firm) and aggregate turnover (concerning the turnover of all firms involved in the merger) depending on the transaction	>	Paragraphs 3.14-3.19, 3.38 and 3.41, <u>Guideline on the Merger</u> Rule
36.	Not mandatory for firms to file a notification of a transaction, such as a merger or an acquisition, with the Competition Authority when the transaction exceeds a set threshold, but firms can voluntarily submit their transaction for review	A A	Schedule 4, Section 7(1) of Schedule 7, Sections 97, 99 and 100, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u> Paragraphs 3.13-3.20, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
37.	No sector excluded from the merger control regulations	>	Sections 4, 8(1) and 9 of Schedule 7, Sections 2(1) and 5, <u>Cap. 619</u> <u>Competition Ordinance</u>

No.	Regulatory Framework	ink	
38.	Granting the Competition Authority powers to investigate whether firms have concluded a transaction that might raise competition concerns for all transactions	Section	on 39, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
39.	The Competition Authority has the power to take action to sanction firms that fail to comply with the merger control regime, but the authority to impose sanctions lies with another agency or appropriate courts		ion 4 of Part 3, Division 4 of Part 12 and Section 92, <u>Cap. 619</u> <u>petition Ordinance</u>
40.	Sanction calculated on the basis of the firm's turnover	Section	on 93(3), <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
41.	The Competition Authority has the power to propose remedies, which are subject to approval and enforcement by another agency or courts, to guarantee that the merger preserves, reinstates and does not adversely affect competition in the relevant market	Comp	on 1 of Part 4, Sections 92, 93 and 155A, <u>Cap. 619</u> <u>Detition Ordinance</u> graphs 5.9-5.15, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
42.	 Requiring proposed remedies by the Competition Authority to: Prioritize the least intrusive remedy while ensuring the realization of the merger's efficiencies Be capable of effective implementation within a short period of time 	Comp	ion 1 of Part 4, Sections 60, 62 and Schedule 2, <u>Cap. 619</u> Detition Ordinance graphs 5.9-5.15, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
43.	Allowing merging parties to propose alternative resolutions to the Competition Authority during the adoption of remedies	Section	on 62 of and Schedule 2, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link	(
44.	The Competition Authority has the power to request a court to enforce a remedy order	>	Section 63, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
45.	The Competition Authority must file a legal challenge against the merger in court to block the merger	>	Sections 97 and 99, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
46.	Establishing multiple but coordinated merger control procedures that include distinct phases or stages based on the potential harm of the transaction	>	Paragraph 1.3, <u>Guideline on Investigations</u> as authorised under Section 40, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
47.	Setting out statutory time limits within which merger control procedures have to be completed for each phase, stage or procedure	>	Schedule 4, Section 7(1) of Schedule 7, Sections 99 and 100, <u>Cap.</u> 619 Competition Ordinance
48.	Establishing a procedure for conducting a simplified merger review	>	Paragraphs 3.13-3.20, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
49.	Establishing a procedure for pre-merger consultations with the Competition Authority to provide pre-merger advice on whether the transaction should be formally notified	>	Paragraphs 5.4-5.8, <u>Guideline on the Merger Rule</u>
50.	Clear provisions on what constitutes confidential information to be protected within investigations and merger control procedures (e.g. business secrets)	>	Section 125, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>
51.	Requiring a Competition Authority to conduct a substantive economic assessment on competitive effects of a transaction submitted for a merger control review	>	Section 6 of Schedule 7, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>

No.	Regulatory Framework	Link
	Allowing firms to justify an increase in market power resulting from a merger or acquisition by arguing that:	Sections 6, 8(1), 8(2) and 9 of Schedule 7, <u>Cap. 619 Competition</u> <u>Ordinance</u>
	The transaction increases efficiency	
	The firm would otherwise exit the market	
	There is an underlying public interest that supersedes competition	

Public Services that Facilitate Trade

[Including services provided by government bureaux and departments, and other public organisations]

Disclaimer: There are other digital public services that aim to facilitate business and compliance in Hong Kong. Please refer to the webpages of individual bureaux / departments / public organisations for details.

Market Competition – Competition Law

No.	Public Services	Link
Com	petition Authority	
1.	Other authorities (e.g. sectoral regulators) that are responsible for protecting and fostering competition in a targeted sector having well-defined mandates in the areas of antitrust and merger control, to avoid overlapping interventions with the Competition Authority	Sections 159-161, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
State	e Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Exclusions from the Application of Com	petition Law
2.	Exemption decisions published online in practice	Block Exemption Orders Register
Mer	ger Control Regulations	
3.	Firms can file notification of a transaction subject to merger control regulations electronically to the Competition Authority in practice	No requirement of filing notification in hard copies in <u>Cap. 619</u> <u>Competition Ordinance</u>
Insti	tutional Framework	
4.	The Competition Authority operationally independent in practice	> Sections 132 and 133, Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
5.	Official office term in years and maximum number of serving terms for board members of the Competition Authority	> Sections 2 and 8 of Schedule 5, <u>Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance</u>

No.	Public Services	Link
6.	Establishing a due process to appoint and dismiss Competition Authority's board members	Sections 5 and 34 of Schedule 5, <u>Cap. 619 Competition</u> <u>Ordinance</u>
7.	Measures to prevent board members and staff of the Competition Authority from taking any jobs that could lead to a conflict of interest	Sections 5 and 34 of Schedule 5, <u>Cap. 619 Competition</u> <u>Ordinance</u>
8.	Case handlers of the Competition Authority adhering to conflict of interest rules in practice	Code of Conduct for Commission/Committee Members (2016 Edition)
9.	The Competition Authority has a mandate to issue opinions on government policies to ensure they do not hinder competition	> Section 130(d), Cap. 619 Competition Ordinance
10.	Opinions of the Competition Authority on government policies published online	Press Releases & Announcements
11.	The Competition Authority publishing the following general guidance	➤ Guideline The First Conduct Rule
	documents online:	Guideline The Second Conduct Rule
	Horizontal agreements	 Guideline The Merger Rule Cooperation and Settlement Policy for Undertakings Engaged in
	Vertical agreements	<u>Cartel Conduct</u>
	Cooperation agreements	 Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct Leniency Policies
	Abuse of dominance	Advisory Bulletin on Conduct of Employers
	Leniency programs	 Advisory Bulletin on Joint Negotiations Competition Commission advises on practices in employment marketplace

No.	Public Services	Link
	 Market definition (including analysis of product and geographical scope) Merger control 	Advisory Bulletin on Competition concerns regarding certain practices in the employment marketplace in relation to hiring and terms and conditions of employment
	 Antitrust enforcement or competition policy related to labor markets 	
12.	The Competition Authority issuing analytical reports on markets from the perspective of competition policy	 Hong Kong's Auto-fuel Market Study Report Report on Market Study for Residential Building Renovation and Maintenance Research & Advisory
13.	The Competition Authority organizing workshops/webinars to disseminate information about competition policy to firms	> Campaigns & Events
14.	The Competition Authority publishing all antitrust and merger control decisions online	Cases in the Competition Tribunal
15.	Established cooperation mechanisms between the domestic and foreign Competition Authorities	> Inter-agency Cooperation